Afghan American Peace Agreement Pdf

The February 2020 peace accords also failed to address the scale of domestic violence. They appear to have led to fewer Taliban attacks on U.S. personnel, but they have not resulted in major incisions in Afghan civilian or military attacks and casualties. Moreover, the peace agreements did not present a proposal for a genuine peace agreement that would somehow mix the forces of the central government and the Taliban – allowing them to cooperate with terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda or IS, create a rule of law and avoid further power struggles and civil conflicts. No one should be shocked that we have succeeded through two American political conventions, without a significant reference to the war in Afghanistan and the prospects for real peace in Afghanistan. The conflict in Afghanistan has become a war that most Americans have every reason to forget. A delegation of Taliban officials and senior Afghan politicians met in Moscow in February and May 2019 for peace talks. [82] [83] Reuters reported that «Russian officials, religious leaders and elders have called for a ceasefire.» [84] On 14 August 2020, Fawzia Koofi, one of 21 members of the Afghan peace team, was attacked by armed men along with her sister Maryam Koofi near Kabul. Fawzia Koofi is a prominent human rights activist in Afghanistan who defends the Taliban. She was also part of the team that represented the Afghan government in peace talks with the Taliban. [140] Although these leaders wield enormous power within the Taliban, they have little or no military experience and are therefore distrusted by commanders on the ground.

These commanders are generally younger than the Quetta Shura, most often in its 20s and 30s. Many operate in remote and hostile parts of Afghanistan, with few links or instructions from Taliban leaders in Quetta. Finally, the real success of the Taliban in the military success of these local commanders in Afghanistan. Thanks to the work of these regional commanders, the Taliban now control nearly 50% of the Afghan landscape. They are at the heart of the Taliban and many have different views on what a peace agreement with the United States should be. The agreement also provides that the Taliban and the Afghan government will begin a «dialogue and negotiations» on 10 March 2020, a date that has already passed. The specific themes of this «dialogue and negotiations» are not specified, but they should at least include the role of the Taliban in a future Afghan government, the role of Islamic law in the Afghan constitution, the protection and rights of women and other minorities and, ultimately, the direction of the country. As a precursor to intra-Afghan negotiations, the agreement states that the United States is ready to cooperate «with all parties concerned» in the release of war prisoners and political prisoners. The agreement provided that the Afghan government would release 5,000 Taliban prisoners by March 10, 2020 and that the Taliban would release 1,000 Afghan prisoners. The release of the prisoners is described as a «spokesman for trust» to stimulate talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

Some symbolic ceasefires do not begin to define the security aspects of a peace settlement between the central government and the Taliban, and they do not show that one is possible. They are not beginning to show how ANDSF could survive without massive permanent help, which probably could not be shared with the Taliban or without the United States.